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Zhu and Chen Revisited: An Update on the
ECJ’s Jurisprudence on the Derivative Rights
of Third-party Nationals
BY DAVID H. KING*
In 2007, I wrote a note for the Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review (“Review”) regarding the European Court
of Justice’s 2004 decision, Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department. In that case, the court considered whether or not to
grant a right of European Union (“Union”) residency to a child born in
Belfast, Northern Ireland, and to her mother, as her caregiver.1 The case
exemplified the issue of ‘birth tourism’ and so-called ‘anchor babies.’ It
also highlighted a legal loophole in the Union: at the time of the case,
Ireland was the only Member State that recognized the jus soli
principle2一that is, automatic Irish citizenship was given to anyone born
on the isle of Ireland.3 The European Court of Justice ultimately decided
the case in favor of both the child and her mother, a case that bolstered
the importance of Union citizenship and reshaped the law in both
Ireland and the Union.4
As part of the 40th Anniversary of the Review, this Update briefly
reviews the Zhu and Chen decision, provides a brief update on how the
* David King is a practicing attorney and adjunct clinical professor at Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles. He graduated from Loyola Law School in 2007 and served as Editor-in-Chief of the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review from 2006-2007.
1. Kunqian Catherine Zhu & Man Lavette Chen, 2004 E.C.R. I-9969 [hereinafter Zhu and
Chen].
2. Sometimes spelled as “ius soli,” it means “right of the soil.” See ISEULT HONOHAN, IUS
SOLI CITIZENSHIP: EUDO CITIZENSHIP POLICY BRIEF NO. 1 (July 31, 2010), http://eudocitizenship.eu/docs/ius-soli-policy-brief.pdf (noting that in 2010 ius soli existed in some form in
19 of the 33 European countries included in the EUDO Citizenship study).
3. Dimitry Kochenov & Justin Lindeboom, Breaking Chinese Law – Making European
One: The Story of Chen, Or: Two Winners, Two Losers, Two Truths (unpublished draft) 7
(University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper, Paper No. 2015/09, May 2015).
4. See id. at 1-2 (showing that in June 2004, a referendum changed the Irish constitution,
requiring lawful residence of three years within the four years immediately preceding the child’s
birth for third-country national parents, before a child born to them can acquire Irish nationality).
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law has evolved since the decision, and concludes with final thoughts
on the issue.
I. BRIEF REVIEW OF ZHU AND CHEN
In the groundbreaking case, Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (“ECJ”) considered the tale of a 25-year old Chinese
woman, Man Lavette Chen, who traveled to Belfast, Northern Ireland,
to have her second child, Kunqian Catherine Zhu. 5 Ms. Chen and her
husband were wealthy Chinese nationals with a controlling interest in
Skychem Corporation, a successful chemical company with a
significant presence in the United Kingdom (“UK”).6 The couple
desired to have a second child, but this was problematic due to China’s
“one-child” policy.7 On the advice of her lawyers, Ms. Chen travelled to
Northern Ireland seven months into her pregnancy.8
Catherine was born on September 6, 2000, and because of Irish
law at the time, automatically became an Irish citizen. 9 Soon after, Ms.
Chen and Catherine relocated to Cardiff, Wales, in the UK.10 Because
Catherine was covered by private health insurance and supported by her
parents’ resources, she fulfilled the residency requirements of Union
Law. When Ms. Chen applied for long-term residence permits for both
herself and Catherine, however, the UK Secretary of State for the Home
Department denied her application.11 Ms. Chen appealed the decision to
the Immigration Appellate Authority (“IAA”). The IAA Adjudicator
heard the case in 2002 and referred it to the ECJ.12
Before the ECJ, the UK and Irish governments asserted that the
ECJ did not have jurisdiction in the case because Catherine had never
crossed a border, and thus had not exercised any free movement rights.
5. Zhu and Chen, supra note 1, at I-9958.
6. JACQUELINE BHABHA, CHILD MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL AGE 84
(2014); Kochenov and Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 1-2.
7. Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 5-6 (referencing China’s Family Planning
Law).
8. Id. at 7-9.
9. Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (Act No. 26/1956 ) (Ir.), available at http://
www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1956/act/26/enacted/en/html?q=+Irish+Nationality+and+Citizenship
+Act+.
10. BHABHA, supra note 6, at 84 (stating that, unlike Ireland, Britain does not grant
automatic citizenship to those born on British soil. Instead, Britain requires that one of the parents
be a lawful permanent resident.); see British Nationality Act 1981, ch. 61 (Eng.).
11. BHABHA, supra note 6, at 84; Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 9.
12. Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 11.
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For this reason, the UK and Irish governments claimed the case was a
“‘wholly internal situation.’”13 Ireland also questioned whether
Catherine qualified as an Union citizen due to her age, arguing that she
lacked the capacity to exercise Union rights, such as the right of
movement or residence.14 The UK also complained that Ms. Chen’s
choice to have her child in Belfast to secure Irish citizenship, and thus
immigration entitlements in Britain, was an abuse of Union Law. 15
The ECJ first evaluated whether Catherine was entitled to
Community rights of residence.16 Under the then-current Treaty
establishing the European Community (EC Treaty), 17 the exercise of the
right to free movement—i.e. crossing the borders of Member States—
triggered the operation of Union citizenship and its provisions.18
Originally, the concept of free movement was associated with economic
activity: the EC Treaty was originally interpreted as allowing free
movement for employed persons who would not be a financial burden
on the Member States and would help achieve the Community’s
objective of a fully-integrated free market economy.19 Although the free
movement principle was established in the EC treaties, Member States
still retained the ability to impose limitations on the right of Community
citizens to enter and take up work within their respective territories. 20
The UK and Irish governments relied on these principles in claiming
that the situation was “purely internal.”
The ECJ however, rejected that argument, ruling in favor of
Catherine. In a relatively short judgment, the ECJ emphasized the fact
that Catherine had received Irish citizenship while residing in the UK,

13. Id. at 13.
14. BHABHA, supra note 6, at 84; Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 14.
15. Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 13.
16. Id. at 15.
17. In December 2007, the Lisbon Treaty was signed and established that the Treaty on the
European Union shall be renamed as the “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May 9, 2008,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. I, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306) 10 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union]. The Lisbon
Treaty abolished the term “European Community.” Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on
European Union, supra note 17, art. 2, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 42.
18. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW INCLUDING BREXIT 20-23, 124
(5th Ed. 2017).
19. See id. at 149.
20. See id. at 153.
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which according to the ECJ gave it jurisdiction in the case.21 By ruling
that Catherine was entitled to Community rights of residence, the ECJ
seemed to create a precedent that having the nationality of a Member
State other than the one in which you are residing triggers the operation
of Union citizenship law.22 The ECJ also dismissed Catherine’s youth as
irrelevant and rejected the UK’s abuse argument. 23 Because Catherine
fulfilled the legal requirements for citizenship and residency, the court
declined to look at the reasons surrounding the child’s birth.24
Next, the ECJ considered whether Article 18(1) of the EC Treaty
allowed Ms. Chen a derivative right of residence.25 Before Chen, the
right of residence for a primary caregiver was typically contingent on
the movement of an economically active Union citizen. 26 But because
Catherine was a child, she was not an economically active Union
citizen. Therefore, Ms. Chen could not rely on secondary legislation,
such as the Council of the European Community’s Directive
90/364/EEC on the right of residence, because it only made a right of
residence possible for dependent blood relatives in the ascending line of
a member state national and Ms. Chen was plainly not dependent on
Catherine.27
In its decision in favor of Ms. Chen, the ECJ granted a right of
residence to the primary caregiver of a non-economically active citizen
for the first time.28 In its ruling, the ECJ relied heavily on Baumbast &
R., noting that refusing to permit a parent to stay would in fact frustrate
the Community rights of the child.29 Thus, the ECJ held that the Union
citizenship of a dependent child is sufficient in order to confer a right of
residence on the caring third-country parent.30 In its decision, the ECJ

21. Kunqian Catherine Zhu & Man Lavette Chen, 2004 E.C.R. I-9963 (“[t]he situation of a
national of a Member State who was born in the host Member State and has not made use of the
right to freedom of movement cannot, for that reason alone, be assimilated to a purely internal
situation”); Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 15.
22. Annette Schrauwen, European Union Citizenship in the Treaty of Lisbon: Any Change
at All, 15 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 55 (2008).
23. Zhu and Chen, supra note 1, at I-9963, I-9967.
24. BHABHA, supra note 6, at 85; Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 16.
25. Zhu & Chen, supra note 1, at I-9965.
26. See Case C-413/99, Baumbast & R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2002 E.C.R. I7091.
27. See Zhu and Chen, supra note 1, at I-9959; JEREMY B. BIERBACH, FRONTIERS OF
EQUALITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU AND US CITIZENSHIP 349 (2017).
28. See Zhu and Chen, supra note 1, at I-9951.
29. Id. at I-9969.
30. Id. at I-9969-70; Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 17.
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again declared that states could not decide which nationals of other
Member States they would recognize as Union citizens.31
The ECJ’s decision was a complete victory for both Ms. Chen and
Catherine. The decision is considered an unprecedented expansion of
the court’s interpretation of then-European Community principles,
specifically the Freedom of Movement and Residence, and the Right to
Enjoyment of Family.
II. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER ZHU AND CHEN
This section briefly summarizes post-Zhu and Chen developments
in the Union and the UK, and ECJ jurisprudence.
A. The European Union and the Lisbon Treaty
Since the Zhu and Chen decision in 2004, the primary legislation
that served as the basis for the decision changed. In 2007, President
Nicolas Sarkozy of France and President Angela Merkel of Germany
promoted a “mini-treaty” between the Member States that would
remove references to “European Community.”32 The Lisbon Treaty was
presented later that year and described technical amendments to the
existing EC Treaty, which it renamed as the “TFEU”.33
Although most of the changes were superficial, Article 9 of the
TFEU was amended to read, “Union citizenship shall be additional to
national citizenship and shall not replace it,” as compared with the 1997
Amsterdam version, which stated “Union citizenship shall complement
and not replace national citizenship” (emphasis added).34 Some
commentators wondered if this indicated that Union citizenship could
someday exist without corresponding national citizenship.35 Those
same commentators also speculated that Union citizens would
increasingly appeal directly to their Union citizenship in court cases,
rather than to nationality of a Member State.36
B. ECJ Jurisprudence
The ECJ regulates the implementation of Union law, ensuring that
the extensive and growing body of Union law (on free movement, etc.)
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See BIERBACH, supra note 27, at 332.
FOLSOM, supra note 18, at 31.
Id.
Baumbast & R, 2002 E.C.R. I-7139; Schrauwen, supra, note 22, at 59.
Schrauwen, supra, note 22, at 60.
Id.
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is appropriately implemented by the Union Member States.37
Historically, the ECJ’s jurisprudence involved Union legislation dealing
with the internal market. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, and
particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on
European Union, the ECJ has increasingly decided immigration cases.38
The Zhu and Chen case strongly reaffirmed the importance of
Union citizenship. The case “is one of the first ‘pure’ EU citizenship
cases decided by the ECJ where the citizenship provisions in the Treaty
proved usable and consequential.”39 Further, the case serves as essential
precedent for protecting the rights of family members of Union citizens
and for fully extending the protections of the law to Union citizen
children.40 The ECJ’s finding that denying Ms. Chen residence “would
deprive the child’s right of residence of any useful effect,” (i.e., the
doctrine of effet utile) became a standard remark in subsequent ECJ
cases, particularly in the 2011 case of Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano.41
Ruiz Zambrano decided the case of Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano and
his wife, both Colombian nationals, who applied for asylum in
Belgium.42 In 2000, Belgian authorities rejected the Zambranos’
applications and ordered them to leave Belgium.43 Due to a nonrefoulment clause in the order,44 and a civil war in Colombia, however,
the Zambranos were not sent back.45
While Gerardo continued to attempt to regularize his situation in
Belgium, Gerardo’s wife gave birth to two children, Diego and Jessica.46
At the time Jessica and Diego were born, Belgium’s Nationality Code

37. BHABHA, supra note 6, at 83. The ECJ must not be confused with the European Court of
Human Rights, which oversees the implementation of the European Convention on Human
Rights in the member states of the Council of Europe.
38. C.M.A. McCauliff, EU Citizenship: Why Can’t the Advocates General Keep Sheila
McCarthy’s Family Together? 36 Fordham Int’l. L. J. 1372, 1377-78 (2013).
39. Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 3.
40. See generally id.
41. Zhu and Chen, supra note 1, at I-9969; see Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v.
Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), 2011 E.C.R. I-1248 (quoting Kunqian Catherine Zhu and
Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, CJEU Case C-200/02, 2004
E.C.R. I-9925) [hereinafter Ruiz Zambrano]; see alsoGerard-Rene de Groot & Ngo Chun Luk,
Twenty Years of CJEU Jurisprudence on Citizenship 15 GER. L.J. 821, 829 (2014); BIERBACH,
supra note 27, at 349.
42. Ruiz Zambrano, supra note 41, at I-1243.
43. Id.
44. Non-refoulement refers to the practice of not forcing refugees or asylum seekers to
return to a country in which they are likely to be persecuted.
45. de Groot & Luk, supra note 41, at 828-29.
46. Ruiz Zambrano, supra note 41, at I-1236.
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provided that any child who was born stateless in Belgium had a right to
Belgian nationality.47 Under Colombian nationality law, children born
abroad to Colombian nationals are not automatically Colombian
nationals; instead, their birth had to be duly reported to a Colombian
embassy or consulate.48 Gerardo intentionally did not register Jessica
and Diego’s births at the Colombian embassy and thus the children did
not obtain Colombian nationality.49 Accordingly, Belgian law granted
both children Belgian nationality.50
When Gerardo was denied an unemployment benefit because he
did not have a right to work in Belgium, he challenged the decision.51
Gerardo asserted his right to work because he was the parent of a Union
citizen.52 Essentially, Gerardo asserted that, like Man Chen and
Catherine Zhu, his children had a right of residence and that their thirdcountry national parent had not only the right to reside, but also the
right to provide for them. 53 However, unlike the Zhu and Chen case,
Jessica and Diego were in a “purely internal situation”: they were
Belgians who had never left Belgium to live in another member state
and had never exercised their right of free movement.54
Nonetheless, in another momentous and far-reaching decision, the
ECJ allowed the minor Union citizens’ rights of residence to breach the
wall of the “purely internal situation” for the first time. 55 While
Directive 2004/38 was by its very design only applicable to mobile
Union citizens, the Court reasoned that the primary legislation, Article
21 of the TFEU (formerly Art. 18 of the EC Treaty), 56 “precludes
national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the
Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred
by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.” 57 This was a new
“jurisdictional test” by the ECJ; rather than travel based on free
movement, “‘the severity of a Member State’s interference with EU
47. Id.
48. Id. at I-1244-45.
49. See id.
50. Ruiz Zambrano, supra note 41, at I-1236.
51. Id.
52. Id. at I-1248.
53. Id. at I-1251.
54. Id. at I-1245-46.
55. Id. at I-1252.
56. At the time of the Ruiz Zambrano decision, the Lisbon Treaty had entered into force.
The EC Treaty was renamed the “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,” and certain
sections were re-numbered. See FOLSOM, supra note 18, at 31.
57. Ruiz Zambrano, supra note 41, at I-1177.

TECH_TO_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

364

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

8/17/2020 1:19 PM

[Vol. 42:3

citizenship’ should be weighed.”58 Based on this reasoning, the ECJ
concluded that Diego and Jessica’s parents must be granted a right of
residence because otherwise the children would have to leave Union
territory to be with and be cared for by their parents.59 Indeed, this new
jurisdictional test appears to have been applied in even more recent ECJ
cases.60
The ECJ also held that “Jessica’s and Diego’s right of residence
meant that their parents also had to be given the right to work, since
otherwise they could not satisfy the requirements of sufficient resources
to have a right of residence as economically inactive Union citizens
. . . .”61 Because the derivative rights flowed from the children to the
parents in an ascending line, even when such children were naturalized
citizens and had never exercised freedom-of-movement rights, the
ECJ’s decision was an unprecedented development in Union law.62
In Ruiz Zambrano, the ECJ extended Chen to the situation in
which a minor Union citizen was not outside of her home Member State
and there were no other apparent cross-border aspects.63 Also, unlike in
Chen, where Ms. Chen already had sufficient resources and the health
insurance required to satisfy Catherine’s right of residence, Jessica and
Diego’s parents had to be given the right to work to be able to help
Jessica and Diego satisfy the requirement.64 Thus, the Court gave
greater weight to the Union citizens’ rights of residence than to the
limitations and conditions placed on it by secondary legislation.65
The case of Ruiz Zambrano is surprising, in part, because of the
Court’s decision to allow the non-European parents of Union citizens,
who were young children and had never lived outside of the Union, to
stay with them, even though it conflicted with the immigration law of
their Member State of nationality (Belgium).66 For that reason, at least
one commentator has compared the Ruiz Zambrano case to the seminal
U.S. case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.67 Brown marked
“the first time that [the U.S. Supreme] Court dared to intervene between

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

C.M.A. McCauliff, “supra note 38, at 1391 (quoting Lenaerts, Civis, at 7).
BIERBACH, supra note 27, at 402; see Ruiz Zambrano, supra note 41, at I-1177.
BIERBACH, supra note 27, at 393-94.
Ruiz Zambrano, supra note 41, at I-1177.
BHABHA, supra note 6, at 85-86; see BIERBACH, supra note 27, at 391-92.
See BHABHA, supra note 6, at 84-86.
Ruiz Zambrano, supra note 41, at I-1252;
Id.
See BIERBACH, supra note 27, at 402.
Id. at 444.
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a state . . . and a duplex citizen who “belonged” to that state, without
. . .” requiring the citizen to be actively engaged in interstate
movement.68 The U.S. Supreme Court “invoked the importance of
children’s education as a foundation of the citizenship of the United
States.”69 Likewise, the ECJ invoked “the importance of not depriving
the children of the most essential of their rights as Union citizens. . .”: if
the parents were to be deported, it would thereby force the children to
leave the territory of the Union.70
The Zhu and Chen and Ruiz Zambrano decisions reflect a forwardlooking approach to residency rights and birthright citizenship. Rather
than basing residency rights on the adult’s time spent in a country, the
ECJ instead evaluates the substantive meaning of the right from the
perspective of the affected citizen.71 Accordingly the ECJ held that the
Union citizenship law looks to the future to define the rights and
obligations it confers. For that reason, the rights of the child who
achieves Union citizenship by birth includes the allowance of rights of
residency for the parents to ensure that the child has the continuing right
to future residency anywhere within Union territory.72
C. UK and Ireland
In addition to the referendum in Ireland that changed the Irish
constitution to eliminate birthright citizenship, the Zhu and Chen case
also led to the current (informal) practice of the UK immigration courts
refusing to refer cases to the ECJ, allegedly in violation of Article 267
TFEU.73 The practice derives from the UK’s well-known contempt
of Union Law.74 Commentators complain that “[a]s a result, we can
expect numerous claimants to have been barred from receiving justice
in the UK, left with no access to the ECJ, the only court empowered to
clarify the meaning of Union law.”75

68. Id.; see generally Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
[hereinafter “Brown”].
69. BIERBACH, supra note 27, at 444; Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
70. BIERBACH, supra note 27, at 444; BHABHA, supra note 6, at 85.
71. BHABHA, supra note 6, at 85-86.
72. Id. at 85.
73. See Kochenov & Lindeboom, supra note 3, at 11, 17. (Before the Zhu and Chen case,
most British courts would leave the dialog with the ECJ to the Court of Appeal and the then
House of Lords. The Zhu and Chen case was unique because the case was referred to the ECJ at
first instance).
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. at 2, 4.
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III. UPDATE REGARDING KUNQIAN CATHERINE ZHU
Zhu and Chen is not simply an important legal case that bolstered
Union citizenship and the rights of non-nationals; it is also a very
human story, about a young, wealthy mother pursuing the best interests
of her child.76 Indeed, lawyers who argued the case on behalf of the
Chens understood that the case had significant implications for
Catherine’s life and future.77 Even the Commission’s representative,
who argued in favor of Catherine and Ms. Chen before the ECJ,
emphasized the underlying humanity in the case, contending, “it was
not a baby case, it was a Catherine case.”78
After the ECJ’s decision in 2004, Catherine and her mother moved
back to ZhuHai, China, to rejoin Catherine’s father and brother. Later,
Catherine’s family moved to the U.S. where Catherine studied and
graduated from Howe Military Academy in Howe, Indiana. Catherine is
now a college student majoring in Health Sciences at Purdue University
in West Lafayette, Indiana.79 Catherine’s parents still have a controlling
interest in Skychem Corporation.
Catherine explains that while initially it was a “shock” when she
realized that she was the subject of an important ECJ case, her role in
the case motivated her to aspire to do great things with her life.
Catherine indicates that her current plan is to graduate from Purdue and
one day become a medical doctor, and this author wishes her much
success in her future endeavors.

76. Id. at 7.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 13. (emphasis in original). See also Kochenov and Lindeboom, supra note 3
(providing fascinating insight into the story behind the case, with interviews of the attorneys
representing the Chens, Ramby De Mello and Adrian Berry, and Adjudicator Michael
Shrimpton).
79. Interview with Kunqian Catherine Zhu, Feb. 20, 2019.
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Kunqian Catherine Zhu and her mother, Man Lavette Chen, in 2018.
Photo courtesy of Catherine Zhu.

IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
As an American law student in 2007, the Zhu and Chen case
piqued my interest because it touched on the issues of birthright
citizenship and so-called ‘anchor babies’ – topics that were familiar to
me because they were issues that had been debated in California and
throughout the U.S. during my entire life.80 Since the Note was
published in 2007, such topics have persisted.81 For example, in October
2018, President Donald Trump raised the issue of birthright citizenship,
announcing that he was preparing an executive order to end birthright
citizenship in the U.S.82 This announcement set off a firestorm of
criticism, since most Americans are of the opinion that American
birthright citizenship is protected by the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.83
Additionally, in January 2019, U.S. authorities announced that
they had charged twenty people in an unprecedented crackdown on
businesses that helped hundreds of Chinese women travel to the U.S. to
80. See LEAH PERRY, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION (2016).
81. Hans A. von Spakovsky, Trump is right – ending birthright citizenship is constitutional,
FOX NEWS (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/trump-is-right-ending-birthrightcitizenship-is-constitutional.
82. Id.
83. See JOSE J. MENDOZA, THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMMIGRATION:
LIBERTY, SECURITY, AND EQUALITY 11 (2017).
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give birth to American citizen children. While it is not illegal to visit the
U.S. while pregnant, authorities said the businesses touted the benefits
of having U.S. citizen babies, who could get free public education and
help their parents immigrate in the future.84
Interestingly, the issue of birthright citizenship is also currently
being debated in Canada. Recently, many Chinese nationals have been
having babies in Canada so that their children are automatically
Canadian citizens at birth.85 For example, in a city outside Vancouver
that is 53% ethnic Chinese, one in five births at the local hospital were
to nonresident mothers.86 Because birthright citizenship is allowed under
its immigration law (not its Constitution), Canada’s Conservatives
adopted a resolution in August 2018 calling for an end to “birth
tourism” in Canada.87
The Zhu and Chen and Ruiz Zambrano decisions demonstrate the
Union’s dramatically different approach to immigration as compared to
the U.S’s approach. In the U.S., illegal alien parents of U.S.-born
children still face deportation. According to the Board of Immigration
Appeals “[t]he mere fact that an alien’s child has been born in the
United States does not entitle the alien to any favored status in seeking
discretionary relief from deportation” (emphasis added).88 At least one
commentator has argued that, in such situations “where the parent’s
alienage trumps the right of the citizen child to parental care and
companionship at home, citizenship loses all effective meaning for
children.”89 In this sense, the child who achieves citizenship by birth in
the U.S. becomes a “mere bystander” in his or her parents’ deportation
proceedings.90 Some argue that giving young citizen children the
‘option’ of staying in their home country without their deported adult
caregivers trivializes the citizenship that was given to the child. 91 A
84. Amy Taxin, US prosecutors announce Chinese birth tourism crackdown, THE
SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2019/jan/31/us-prosecutors-announcechinese-birth-tourism-crac/ (last updated Jan. 31, 2019, 11:12 PM).
85. Dan Bilefsky, ‘Birth Tourism’ Is Legal in Canada. A Lawmaker Calls It Unscrupulous,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/world/canada/china-birthtourism.html.
86. Id.
87. Konrad Yakabuski, Canada Needs An Honest Debate About Birthright Citizenship,
GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-needsan-honest-debate-about-birthright-citizenship/.
88. BHABHA, supra note 6, at 88; Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1980).
89. BHABHA, supra note 6, at 89.
90. Id. at 89-90.
91. Id. at 91-92.
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“just legal framework,” according to some, is one that “incorporat[es] a
child’s perspective . . . and increase[s] the burden on the deporting state
to demonstrate that the benefits of parental removal outweigh the costs
of child separation . . . . “92
On the other hand, of course, is the concern that granting rights to
the parents of so-called ‘anchor babies’ rewards potential bad behavior
of the parents. The argument is that attaching parental immigration
rights to children’s birthright citizenship produces undesirable
migratory outcomes.93 For such reasons, punishing or deporting a parent
who desires to gain U.S. citizenship by having a child in the U.S. may
be socially and politically justifiable.94
The Zhu and Chen and Ruiz Zambrano decisions, and others like
them, serve as essential reminders of the human element to this
complicated issue. Because such cases involve innocent children—who
obviously have no control over where they are born or to whom they are
born—these cases are even more sympathetic and intriguing. The ECJ
appears to be deciding immigration cases from the perspective of the
child Union citizen, to protect their rights of residence above all other
limitations or conditions. Only time will tell whether the ECJ’s
approach is the best one for the Union and her Member States.

92. Id. at 92-93.
93. Id. at 92.
94. Id.

